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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant Bert Slavens appeals from a judgment 
entered in the lower court wherein his answer was stricken for 
failure to appear at his deposition and produce requested 
documents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a hearing on February 7, 1975, Judge Allen 
B. Sorensen ordered Appellant's answer stricken, his default 
entered, and a partial summary judgment to enter, which judg-
ment order was signed March 10, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to sustain the entry of the 
default and partial summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, 
Respondents substantially accept the statement of facts of 
Appellant with a few minor clarifications contained in the 
argument and only wish to point out to the court a general 
appearance was entered by Appellant through counsel Gary D. 
Stott in the form of an answer (R. 11) and the motion for 
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summary judgment -. i ••.- • - .upper >\ i n. .^ff idavir: = . J -- 3nd 
r e q u e s t : l o r <\ : ' • • -.' • ' . -^> : - . • r * ' ••* •. . . . - p * , u t 
by mai l 
POINT I 
IT WAS WITHIN THE COURT'S POWER 
AND DISCRETION TO ENTER THE DE-
FAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT 
Rule 3'-•-!' ^ R C P reads ^s : •> 1 1 o-w ,: 
"If a party or an officer, director, 
or managing agent of a party... fails (1) to 
appear before the officer who is to take his 
deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice...the court in which the action is 
pending on motion may make such orders in 
regard, to the failure as are just, and among 
others it may take any action authorized 
under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of sub-
division • bx (2) o £ t h i s r u 1 e . " 
(C) ol Lhe foregoing subsection re.-d*- • ;•. *.'. ! 
"An order striking out pleadings UL 
parts thereof, or staying further proceeds 
until the order j s obeyed, or dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party;" 
A." pi • 1.11ued uuc ii, . \...ue] 1 ai 11f s bi::i ef, Ru 1 e 3 7 (ci) 
forniorlv re;,., \.nH] .Jnl^ "J - ; 2 , 
"If a party or an officer or managing 
agent of a party willfully fails to appear be-
fore the officer who is to take h i s deposi tion. " 
( emphasis added ) 
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Since July A , " , n" Uie Uf. ah Rule on appearance 
for depositions Mas been identical co it* ; honqo i - • i 
Federa . . .M-'-dines..' •- !:•> uie Federal Rnl.es of Civj I, Procedure, 
therefore1, *he element o: '• i lll.ulness" in AppeJlarf:"s mis-
conduct 1 las no longer be- . • -^^ :-,ii -nt l.o u- s
 ;. _ * ,e sanction' 
o* : le current Pule ^7(P; ,ir.d ^ ;is; . -' C) as quotes ab>vc. 
With this being the present rule and ±n c, .-] 
o,_ b : i > •" ' r-d. :..i:-- sc ' • »•-' procedure; it w.jiu appear 
that ai i •>; tne cases citoo in Appellant's hrief whirh predate 
the elimination ( f the willful ruisconduc" -.: s,!. -•••• •
 {.:.-
d . s i. sq i - .'. -i n;.! :• he rule now shonlu place the burden 3S 
the defendant: to explain ^r justify his failure to adhere co 
rules of procedure, • ' 
Appellant's Point. I asserts !;he proposition that 
defendant Slavens' nonappearance was "not -. * illui" and it, was, 
therefore, error s • '.. *• ; L , CJ ex .? e^sault iudgment. No-
where in the recoiu in t-ii :_ s case ±s Lhere asy evidence to sup-
port sucl: i ai i assertion. d-s published deposition, whieli i;3 puit 
of tl le record i n tl: i.:i s cai . states a^ fojfows: 
"Mr. McRae: May i.t be further stipulated 
that Bert Slavens is not present? 
;. Mr. Stott: So stipulate. 
Mr. McRae: And turihoi, that hi. pr—--n- e 
was demanded ..
 {. ...s-. • . lt. notice of the taking uf 
this deposition? 
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Mr, Stot.L: - „ .,-'_ in ay." 
In view of the change :;.n the sanction aspect of 
Rule 37, it, would appear that the more logical nil €* is as 
contained ix i Jackson v. Kotzebue Oil Sales, 1"' FRD 204 at 
206 wherein it was hold: • 
"No justifiable excuse appears or 
has even been suggested as to why plaintiff's 
previous interrogatories had not been answered, 
which were served nearly three months before 
the legislature convened.'1 
Tii.u. ;.;se, including t;ie record before thia co,et. 
ia completely vc;h, o: an_\ justifiable excuse, attempu oi *i- " 
by Appellant to ever appear t-r r •.!; ;;Osicion or to produce the 
documents which wei e demanded, of him at the time of his sched-
uled appearance for deposition purposes. at Is a ope.; .--'^ a 
stand or LaiL baaed on the record... For ohia proposition, see 
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 3 69 p. 2a 4iJ, 
which i s the only pronouncement by f h Ls cuui I interpreting 
Ri i] e 3 i; , whereir :i thj s court stated: 
"Inasmuch as i io transcript of what 
transpired before the trial court on December 19, 
1963, has been brought to us, it is to be pre-
sumed that the proceeding supports the judgment." 
I n
 Moore ' s Federa 1 Practice, .. /-</' , I.s io-.v ': the 
foJ 1 owing statement: 
"Rule 37(d) makes it explicit that a 
party properly served has aii absolute duty to 
respond, that is, to present himself for the 
taking of his deposition, or serve answers or 
objections to interrogatories served upon him, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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or serve a response to requests for dis-
covery under Rule 34, as the case may be, and 
that the court in which the action is pending 
may enforce this duty by imposing sanctions 
for its violation. Rule 37(d) deals, then, 
with failure to make the initial response re-
quired by the Rules while subdivisions (a) and 
(b) provide a method of resolving differences 
between the parties and enforcing the court's 
determination. Thus there must be an order 
under subdivision (a) before sanctions are 
imposed under (b), while under (d) the party 
aggrieved moves directly for the imposition 
of sanctions." 
Since under Tucker v. Nunley, supra, it is presumed 
that the record and the proceedings in front of Judge Sorensen 
support his findings of no justification having been offered 
by Appellant for nonappearance, the "second chance" rule pleaded 
by Appellant in his Point II should not be followed or even pro-
mulgated by this court as such a rule is in direct contravention 
of the spirit of Rule 1 URCP and the intended sanctions pro-
mulgated by this court when the modifications to the discovery 
rules were enacted and became effective July 1, 1972. 
Appellant cites Schachtv. Janits, 53 F.R.D. 321, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) and quotes alleged language from the case but 
the case deals with change of venue, a motion to consolidate 
cases, motions for force acceptance of service, to amend com-
plaints and to enforce subpoenas. Other motions are also 
raised but not one deals with any aspect of Rule 37. Further-
more, the language quoted is nonexistent. It simply is not 
anywhere in the opinion. 
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Similarly, Lizak v. Zadrozny, 41 111 App. 1023, 
283 N.E. 2d 252 (1972) is cited for the proposition that when 
a deposition fails to be taken a second chance must be given 
to the failing party. Appellant again cites language and, 
again, no such language exists in the body of the opinion. 
Furthermore, the case does not deal with depositions at all, 
nor with any other aspect of discovery or Rule 37. 
Cinelli v. Radcliffe, 35 A.D. 2d 829, 3317 N.Y.S. 
2d 97 (1970) is perhaps the very best case that Appellant has 
for his position. This opinion is two paragraphs long and 
gives no facts concerning the taking of the deposition or the 
parties' reaction to it or the court's handling of the situa-
tion. Certainly, the rule is too well settled that a holding 
does not go beyond its facts to need citations, but if that is 
not the rule, then Respondents cite Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, (6th Cir. 1975), 249 F. 2d 885, a three to four para-
graph opinion with no facts that hold a judgment valid for 
failure to appear. The point is, as Appellant's own cases 
show, the rule is not so simplistic. A failing party is not 
always given a second chance except under very definite cir-
cumstances, for example: In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S. 2d 
227 (Fla. 1973), the rule is not as mechanical as Appellant would 
make it appear to be. The language in Appellant's brief would 
seem to support Cinelli, supra, unequivocally, except that the 
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following paragraph of the opinion qualifies the rule: 
"The principle (of granting a second 
chance) would appear applicable where, as here, 
the party who was initially disobedient promptly 
offers compliance, which if made would serve the 
purpose of the discovery without undue delay of 
the action," (284 S. 2d at 227) (Emphasis added) 
In Goldstein, supra, the failing party "promptly" agreed to 
submit to a physical examination in time for the trial even 
though at first she had refused on affidavit because of 
emotional fear. Gill v. Stolow, (2nd Cir. 1957) 240 F. 2d 669, 
in dicta says the very same thing. In that case, even though 
the answer came at a very late date in the proceedings, since 
the excuse was valid the court allowed a dismissal of the de-
fault judgment because there was a showing of attempted compli-
ance in good faith and because plaintiff would not be prejudiced 
by the delay. 
Beal v. Reinertson, 298 Minn. 542, 215 N.W. 2d 57 
(1974) is to the same effect. The default was vacated because 
there would really be no delay. The order to produce, the re-
fusal to produce and the order of default were granted within 
one month and the court felt that thirty days was neither a 
great delay nor prejudicial to plaintiff, especially since the 
failing party was willing to produce some things. 
Rapoport v. Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A. 2d 424 (1965) 
was decided on the basis that the record revealed that Sirott 
was requesting that the order of deposition be vacated because 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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he was under indictment in Pennsylvania and his appearance 
there would prejudice him tremendously. The appellate court 
felt that on the basis of that affidavit Sirott should have 
been granted a chance to appear at a hearing by counsel and 
explain and the default judgment should not have been entered 
without such a hearing. It is also important that Sirott 
agreed that he would take a deposition in Nevada, his state 
of residence, or he would answer interrogatories. On that 
showing the court could not find Scott's nonappearance sup-
portive of the default judgment. 
In Bender v. Pfotenhauer, 21 111. App. 3d 127, 315 
N.E. 2d 13 7 (1974) the appellate court sustained the lower 
court's finding that appellant had not sustained "the burden 
of establishing by affidavit or otherwise that his failure to 
comply with the rules was warranted by extenuating circumstances 
or events". At p. 139, although several attempts were made to 
have Appeallant appear, there is no language at all in the case 
that even mentions a "second chance" rule. The entire case is 
cast in terms of Appellant failing to excuse himself. 
Appellant's final case authority under his Point II 
is Housing Authority of City of Alameda v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 
3rd 371, 102 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1972) which is more damaging to 
his case than it is helpful. In that case the lower court held 
a hearing on the default judgment and the failing party's attorney 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeared. The appellate court upheld the default judgment 
order because he was given an opportunity to explain the 
failure to appear and all he did was give some vague, inde-
finable time that his client would appear and offered nothing 
else. 
From the above cases, it is clear that Appellant's 
"second chancefr rule, as he applies it, is clearly erroneous. 
The true rule as it emerges from the above case is as follows: 
A. If a party fails to appear or produce, default 
judgment may be entered provided that: 
!•" A hearing is held on the motion. 
2. Failing party is given a chance to 
appear and explain. 
3. A second chance will be awarded when: 
(a) It will not prejudice the opposing 
party. 
(b) Failing party has offered some 
reason to exculpate his nonappearance. 
B. The appellate court will not overturn the lower 
court's default judgment unless there is a clear showing of 
abuse of discretion. Virtually every case Appellant cites 
states this rule. 
The record would indicate that it is obvious Appellant 
was aware of the progress in the case since, after belated at-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tempts to get this matter before the trial court, Appellant 
did appear with his present counsel at the December 20, 1974 
pre-trial conference. The record is further clear from the 
transcript of that proceeding that no justification for Appel-
lant's nonappearance is evident. 
Respondents respectfully submit that this court should 
disregard the cases decided under the old rule involving "will-
ful" failure to appear and consider the obligations and duties 
of parties under rules as they are presently enacted. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 56 URCP 
In the court's findings in support of the judgment 
entered in this case (R. 52), the court made the following 
finding: 
"Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judg-
ment was set for oral argument on February 7, 1975, 
at which time Robert M. McRae appeared for plain-
tiffs, Gary D. Stott appeared for defendant Perry, 
and Rex Lewis appeared for defendant Slaven, and 
the file containing no justification for the delays 
in defendant Slaven1s appearance for the purposes 
of being examined under oath in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor for his fail-
ure to produce documents, demand for which had 
been served on his counsel of record, and no counter-
affidavit or responsive pleading being of record,..." 
This finding by the court dealt with the failure of 
Appellant to rebut by affidavit or otherwise, as required by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
Rule 56, the amounts of money paid by plaintiffs to contrac-
tors who were pressing for payment of unpaid bills incurred 
by defendants under the terms of the construction contract. 
Rule 56(e) URCP states as follows: 
"When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
(by affidavit) an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." 
Appellant did not respond to the affidavits of 
plaintiff and the court for this additional reason properly 
granted a judgment against Appellant as a defaulting party. 
This rule has been discussed by this court on numerous occasions 
and is clearly set forth in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274 at 279, 508 P. 2d 538. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the modifications to Rule 37(d) URCP and 
the elimination of the element of "willfulness" in nonappear-
ance, the trial court was correct in striking Appellant's 
answer and entering a default judgment. This conclusion is 
fairly supported by the lack of response or endeavor by Appel-
lant to remedy his defaults prior to the February 7, 1975 hear-
ing date. Further, Appellant's failure to comply with Rule 56(d) 
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in opposing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment warrants 
the entry of the judgment in any event. 
Respondents request this court to sustain the trial 
court and to award Respondents their costs. 
Respectfully submitted/ 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
370 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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